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parties can hardly be an attack upon the trust, or a breach of the
very limited fiduciary relation.
In Miller v. Mitchell the court defined the powers of a trustee
as limited by the instrument creating the trust. He has no power
to receive payment of the debt, and discharge the debtor, where
the deed has not expressly conferred such power. In the ordinary
trust deed, where property is conveyed merely as security for a
debt, no such power is conferred. True though it is that a trustee
cannot by his sole act discharge himself from his duties,' yet it is
difficult to understand why he should be denied the privilege of
going into a court of competent jurisdiction to have the trust declared discharged.
It would seem that West Virginia has misapplied the doctrine
that a trustee cannot derive a benefit from his position at the expense of his cestu que trust, by extending it to a situation where
a trustee seeks an adjudication of the rights of the parties where
he has a substantive interest.

-A.
HUSBAND

AND

WIFE -

WILLIAM PETROPLUS.

ANTE-NuPTIAL

TORT

BY

HUSBAND

The plaintiff, in 1929, commenced an action against the defendant, claiming
damages for personal injuries caused by his negligent driving of
a motor car in 1928, in which car the plaintiff was a passenger.
Three months after the suit was started they were married. Defendant was allowed to amend his defense by adding "Parties
have, since the issuance of the writ, inter-married and are now
husband and wife." It was admitted that the real defendant in
the action was the insurance company with which the defendant
was insured. Held: that her right of action was not such P,
"thing in action" as would become her separate property withiii
the meaning of the Married Women's Property Act, but was barred by the general disability of the husband and wife to sue each
other for a tort. Gottliffe v. Edelston.1
This English case in denying relief for personal injuries
against a spouse follows the recognized weight of authority in
the United States.! Decided as it is, at a time when many claim
AGAINST WIFE -

EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE. -

7 58 W. Va. 431, 52 S. E. 487 (1905).
See also Fidelity Insurance Co. v.
Shenandoah Railway Co., 32 W. Va. 244, 9 S. E. 180 (1889).
8
PERRY ON TRUSTS (7th ed. Baldes 1929), § 274.
12 K. B. & P. 378 (November 5, 1930).
2Heyman v. Heyman, 19 Ga. App. 634, 92 S. E. 25, (1917); Rogers v.
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the trend is toward the minority rule, permitting a tort action by
the wife against the husband under married women's statutes,
the case is quite significant.3 The case goes further on its facts
than the American decisions
The English court openly announces that the real defendant
in the suit is the insurance company and that the wife is suing her
husband in order to reach this insurance fund.' The American
courts have undoubtedly recognized this as the basis for the departure from the common law rule in permitting a recovery by the
wife against the husband in tort, but because of the American
rules of procedure the reason has not been openly asserted. The
English Married Women's Property Act is similar to the statutes
in the states of the United States.' As to the right to sue the court
held that in spite of the changing conception of the marital relation and the enlargement of women's rights, nevertheless marriage
creates a most important status and one which should create also
a substantial identity of social and other interests between husband
and wife.
The cause of action in the Gottliffe case arose before the
parties were married or even engaged and yet it was held the right
to sue did not survive after the parties were married. The English
statute gave the wife the right to sue her husband or any other
person or persons in regard to her separate estate as if she were a
feme sole.' West Virginia has a statute which may be construed to
Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S. W. 382 (1915); Lillunkamp v. Rippetoe, 133
Tenn. 57, 179 S. W. 628 (1915); Sykes v. Speer, 102 Tex. 451, 112 S. W.
422 (1908); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629 (1911);
Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N. W. 1047 (1906); Peters v. Peters,
156 Cal. 32, 103 Pac. 219 (1909); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So.
591 (1924); Finn v. Finn, 19 Ohio App. 302 (1924); Walt-man v. Waltman,
153 Minn. 217, 189 N. W. 1022 (1922); also see the cases collected in note
(1920) 6 A. L. R.1038.
OCrowell v. Crowell, 180 N. C. 516, 105 S. E. 206 (1920); Roberts v.
Roberts, 185 N. 0. 566, 118 S. E. 9 (1923); Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S. C.
45, 102 S. E. 787 (1920); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 89 (1914);
Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N. H. 4, 95 Atl. 657 (1915); Fiedeer v. Fiedeer, 42
Old. 124, 140 Pac. 1022 (1914); Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 186 S.
W. 832 (1916); Mathewson v. Mathewson, 79 Conn. 23, 63 Atl. 285 (1906);
Harris v. Harris, 211 Ala. 222, 100 So. 333 (1924); Bushnell v. Bushnell,
103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925).
'See note (1930) 37 W. VA. L. Q. 92.
r"The explanation of the continuance of this action by wife and husband
is to be found in the modern practice of insuring against motor accidents.
It was frankly stated at the trial that the interests of an insurance company
depended on the result of this action."
04"A married woman may sue or be sued, in contract or tort, as if she
were a feme sole and her husband need not be joined."
'Every woman whether married before or after this Act, shall have in her
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have the same effect.8 Under this, the plaintiff argued the negligence of the defendant before marriage gave the plaintiff a cause
of action against him, a "thing in action" and therefore a right
of property and when the defendant married the plaintiff it became her separate property right. The court stated that as used
in the Married Women's Property Act this extended meaning
could not be given. The word "property" in the act must be
read in the light of its general policy so far as any policy at all
can be inferred from it. The defendant did not destroy the plaintiff's property in the ordinary sense but to infringe upon her
right of personal safety and security. Goods would be property
in the true sense.
The English court has undoubtedly given this construction
to a "chose in action" because it was deemed to reach the desirable result in not permitting the wife to sue her husband. If this
were an action against a third party it is clear the marriage would
have no effect and the right could properly be called a property
right within the act. In the West Virginia case of Stevens v.
Friedman?it was held that the marriage of a female plaintiff pending an action brought by her for personal injuries is not cause for
abatement of the action.
The interpretatioi given the meaning of property in the English case indicates a strong tendency to refuse actions in tort by
the wife against the husband. The conclusion reached is satisfactory despite the reasoning employed to support it.
-JEROME KATz.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION AS
GROUND FOR DENYING DECREE oF.-In the recent case of Weeks
v, Pratt et al.,' decided in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, plaintiffs, (the Pratts), sued for
specific performance of an contract into which they had entered
with defendant, who had invented a fuel-saving device for internal
own name against all persons whomsoever, including her husband, the same
civil remedies for the protection and security of her own separate property."
8W. VA. REV. CODE (1931), c. 48, art. 3, § 1. "The separate property,
real and personal, of a married woman, heretofore acquired . .

.

. shall be

and remain her sole and separate property in all-respects as if she were a
single woman." It was held in Clay et ux. v. City of St. Albans, 43 W. Va.
539 (1897) that a married woman may sue alone or she and her husband
together, at law or equity, in any action or suit concerning her separate
property.
'58 NV. Va. 78, 51 S.B. 132 (1905).

'43 F. (2d) 53 (1930).
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